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North America
JENNIFER D. KEENE

The war in Europe had an immediate and direct impact on North America.
The United States and Canada acted on their strong cultural, economic and
political ties to Britain by contributing men, money and material to the
Allied side. Mexico, long the site of economic competition between the
United States, Britain and Germany, found itself at the centre of diplomatic
intrigues which climaxed with the Zimmermann Telegram. Relations with
Europe, however, only tell one side of the North American story. Within
North America, populations shifted northwards to compensate for labour
shortages once the war curtailed European immigration. To meet the Allies'
escalating demands for industrial and agricultural products, Canada openly
recruited US-based farm and factory workers, promising high wages and
cheap transport until the US entry into the war dried up this labour stream.
US labour agents turned southwards as well, fuelling the movement
of southern workers to northern industrial centres with similar enticements.
The 500,000 African Americans who joined this migratory wave (known
as the Great Migration) set in motion a political and cultural reordering that
transformed the racial landscape within the United States. Hundreds
of thousands of Mexicans also migrated to the United States, mostly to
escape the political and economic turmoil caused by the ongoing Mexican
Revolution.
These demographic shifts are just one example of how considering North
America as an entity during the First World War offers the alluring possibility
of breaking away from the strictures of the normal nation-state approach to
studying the war, presenting an opportunity to consider the war's regional
and global dimensions. Uncovering the full scope of 'North America's War'
requires evaluating Britain's dominant position in the global political economy, North America's contribution to the fighting, international relations
within North America and how North American-based events and initiatives
affected the course of the war and the peace.
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Britain's stature as the world's largest imperial power, centre of the financial
world and dominant naval force, meant that its entry into the war affected
nearly every nation in some way. Indeed the cultural, political and economic
ties that bound the United States and Canada to Great Britain distinctly
shaped the war experience of these two North American nations. As citizens
of a self-governing Dominion within the British Empire, 'Canadians had no
choice about their involvement in the war, but they did have a voice when it
came to deciding on the extent of their participation', notes David
1
MacKenzie. The United States declared itself a neutral nation in 1914, but
its financial and political elite offered aid to Britain that affected the course
of American neutrality almost immediately. Taking advantage of these
bonds, Britain moved quickly to facilitate economic mobilisation in
Canada and the United States by establishing a robust munitions industry
where none had previously existed.
managing a coordinated network
that secured contracts, purchased machinery, inspected factories and transported goods overseas, Britain successfully funnelled North American
resources towards its own shores and away from Germany.
The strong US-British trading and financial wartime relationship evolved
naturally from pre-existing bonds. 'Britain was by far America's largest pre2
war trading partner', Robert H. Zieger points out. Less than six months after
the war began, the House of Morgan, the financial powerhouse run by the
]. P. Morgan bank, signed on as the purchasing and contracting agent for
the British government within the United States. Over the next two years, the
House of Morgan worked closely with British officials to award more than
4,000 contracts worth over $3 billion to American businesses. 3 Between 1915
and 1917 US exports doubled, with 65 per cent going to Great Britain. 4 In 1916
the British Foreign Office evaluated Britain's depend~ncy on the United
States, reaching the alarming conclusion that for 'foodstuffs, for military
necessities and for raw materials for industry, the United States was "an
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absolutely irreplaceable source of supply"' .5 This booming trade in rifles,
gunpowder, shells and machine guns also benefited the American economy
pulling it out of recession, and created the industrial infrastructure that
6
would eventually support the US war effort.
The Anglophile House of Morgan aided the British cause even further by
lending the British government enormous sums and putting pressure on other
American banks to deny loans to Germany.7 The money flowing from
American coffers to the British bolstered the entire Allied side, as the British
in turn loaned money to other Entente nations like France and Russia, that
could not secure American loans on their own. The $250 million per month
that Britain spent in the United States by 1916 (mostly to bolster the sterlingdollar exchange rate to keep commodity prices in check), 'reflected a dependence on American industry and on the American stock market which in
German minds both justified the submarine campaign and undermined the
8
United States' claim to be neutral', writes Hew Strachan.
In November 1916, this flow of US credit suddenly appeared in jeopardy
of drying up. The Federal Reserve Board warned the House of Morgan to
refrain from making unsecured loans to Britain, which by this point had
nearly extinguished the gold reserves and securities used as collateral for
US loans. 'Lack of credit was about to crimp and possibly cut off the Allies'
stream of munitions and foodstuffs', John Milton Cooper, Jr. contends,
scenario only averted by America's April 1917 entry into the war. 9 Hew
Strachan remains more sceptical about any potential rupture in this financial
partnership. Cutting off war-related trade with Britain would have sent the
American economy into a recessionary tailspin, he argues. Strachan goes so
far as to suggest that in the long run, continued US neutrality might have

l David MacKenzie, 'Introduction: myth, memory, and the transformation of Canadian
soci.ety', in Mac~enzie (ed.), Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert
Craig Brown (Umversity of Toronto Press, 2005), p. 3.
2 Robert H. Zieger, America's Great War: World War I and the American Experience (Oxford:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 12.
3 Ibid., pp. 30-I.
4 Paul A. C. Koistinen, Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American
W mfare, 1865-1919 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997), p. l2I.

5 Kathleen Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918 (Boston, MA: Allen &
Unwin, 1985), p. 8I.
6 Both the United States and Canada expanded agricultural production to meet Allied
demand_. L?w-interes~ loans encouraged farmers to increase their production through
mechamsation or buymg more land. The high prices negotiated for overseas wheat and
cotton sales made the increased debt seem negligible, but in the 1920s declining crop prices
depressed the American and Canadian farming industry. These 'sick' economic sectors
intensified the severity of the economic depression that swept the world in 1929, revealing
how long North America suffered the aftershocks of the global economic mobilisation
during the First World War.
7 After the United States entered the war, the government took over financing the Allies and
lent them nearly $n billion during the period of active fighting and reconstruction. 'Less
than $1 billion of the money lent by the American government was ever repaid, but all of the
approximately $3 billion owed to private U.S. investors was', writes Paul A. C. Koistinen,
Mobilizingfor Modern War, p. 135·
8 Hew Strachan, The First World War (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 228.
9 John Milton Cooper, Jr., Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Knopf, 2009), p. 373.

512

513

JENNIFER D. KEENE

North America

benefited the Allied side more than American belligerency, since its 'financial
commitment to the Entente' had already 'bound the United States to its
survival and even victory'. ro As a belligerent the United States now competed
with Britain for American-produced munitions and foodstuffs to supply its
own army.
Great Britain also called upon Canada to produce iron, steel, artillery shells
and chemical weapons. Jn r9r4 Canada boasted only one munitions factory.
Over the course of the war, a British-run Imperial Mwtitions Board (JMB)
oversaw the creation of nearly 600 factories to produce shells, fuses, propellants and casings. 'Close to a third of the shells fired by the British army in 1917
were Canadian-made', notes Desmond Morton.rr Booming Canadian textile,
farming and lumbering industries helped pull the Canadian economy out of a
pre-war recession, profits that Canadians used to purchase the domestic war
loans floated by the Canadian government. Unlike Britain, Canada did not
require massive loans from the United States to finance its war effort. Britain's
desire to spend American loans in Canada, to the benefit of the Canadian
economy, required a demonstration of reciprocity. In 1917, for instance,
Britain only secured approval for using US-government loans for Canadian
wheat purchases by promising to send at least half of it to American flour mills
for processing. 12
The cultural ties between the United States, Canada and Great Britain were
very much in evidence throughout the war. Within the United States, Great
Britain unleashed a ferocious propaganda campaign which emphasised
German atrocities in Belgium and the loss of civilian life during Germany's
forays into unconditional submarine warfare. British blockade practices
arguably killed more civilians than Germany's unconditional submarine warfare, but German propaganda never found an equally compelling way to
13
arouse American ire. The Germans increasingly gained a reputation as the
enemies of civilised mores. A good case in point was the overwhelming
success that Britain had framing how Americans viewed the Lusitania sinking.

ro p.99r.
Hew Strachan, The First World War, vol.

I:

To Anns (Oxford University Press, 2001),

n Desmond Morton, Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War, 1914-1919
(Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989), p. 82.
12 Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918, pp. 172-4.
13 Alan Kramer estimates that 478,500-700,000 German civilians (depending on the source)
died from blockade-related starvation and disease as compared to 14,722 British merchant seamen. Alan Kramer, 'Combatants and noncombatants: atrocities, massacres,
and war
2012),
pp.crimes',
195-6. in John Horne (ed.), A Companion to World War I (Oxford: Blackwell,
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amphibious German invasion. These isolationists stood ready to defend
their territorial borders, but found the idea of sending armies outside the
Western Hemisphere unsettling. Throughout North America, scepticism
flourished in ethnic and economic communities that had strong political
reasons for opposing or limiting participation in the war. Isolationist sentiment within the United States was particularly strong among German
Americans and Scandinavians in the Midwest, Irish Americans and the
rural South. These populations embraced isolationism for a variety of
reasons: support for relatives in Germany, religious objections, hatred of
Great Britain and distrust of the eastern financial elite making loans to the
Allies. Appeals to protect the British Empire failed to sway many French
Canadians, who worried that wartime mobilisation would accelerate AngloCanadian nation-building. French-Canadian elites pledged support to the
war, but many others embraced an ethnic-based North American nationalism that prompted them to resist fighting an overseas war. Concerned that
the wartime push towards Anglo-conformism threatened their cultural
autonomy and civil liberties, French Canadians proved reluctant to enlist
and openly opposed conscription.
Critics of isolationism countered that it was not the Atlantic Ocean that
protected North America, but the British navy. Canada and the United States
benefited tremendously from the blanket of protection that British control
of the seas offered to its former and present colonies, they argued. Britain
maintained this naval dominance (with only occasional challenges from
German U-boats) throughout the war by controlling shipping lanes, blockading the North and Baltic Seas through patrols and mines and providing
ships to transport goods to Europe. Early 1917 was one crucial period when
Germany threatened to gain the upper hand at sea. In February 1917 Germany
resumed unconditional submarine warfare, knowing that this decision was
likely to bring the United States formally into the war. Germany gambled that
a relentless U-boat assault on shipping would force Britain and France to
capitulate before the United States could offer much help on the battlefields.
The sharp increase in German submarine attacks once it resumed unconditional submarine warfare (reaching a wartime high of 2.2 million tons from
April-June 1917) left British Admiral John Jellicoe pessimistic over Britain's
future capacity to wage war. Canadian-born US Admiral William Sims offered
the solution - instituting a convoy system that relied on US destroyers
(rather than Britain's slower battleships) to accompany groups of ships crossing the Atlantic. The use of convoys meant that in 1918, for the first time since
1915, Allied shipbuilding exceeded losses at sea. 'Better than almost any

other single factor, the convoy system reveals the truly global nature of World
War I', writes Michael Neiberg. 17
During the war the United States switched from being a debtor nation,
dependent on British financing for its industrial development, to a creditor
nation that did more than lend money to belligerents to fund purchases of
American goods. When British financiers began liquidating their assets
throughout the underdeveloped world to fund the war, American bankers
and industrialists seized on the chance to finance and construct mines, railroads, factories and oil fields throughout the Western Hemisphere. America's
geographical location vis-a-vis Mexico became a distinct advantage that aided
its penetration into markets previously dominated by Britain. Accelerating a
shift already underway, US imports to Mexico rose from 49.7 per cent of all
imported goods to 66.7 per cent, while the British market share dropped from
18
13 per cent to 6.5 per cent from 1913 to 1927. Canada underwent a similar shift
from borrower to lender, the result of credits extended to Britain for purchases of wheat and munitions.
Yet the war also laid bare the American and Canadian dependence on British
purchases of its crops and manufactured goods for sustained prosperity allowing Britain, at least for the time being, to retain its position as the epicentre
of the international political economy. The twin effects of 'Britain's multiple
centrality to the world economy [which] gave her critical leverage in moving
resources toward the Allies and away from the Central Powers' and 'the United
States' awesome productive capacity', produced a combination that was difficult
19
for Germany and her allies to match, Theo Balderston concludes. The outcome of the war seemingly reinforced Britain's world supremacy, as evidenced
by its ability to call upon a variety of resources (men, money and material) from
North America to defeat its European enemies.
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North America's military experience
Both the United States and Canada entered the war unprepared. In 1914,
Canada possessed a regular army of just 3,000 with 70,000 in volunteer
militias. The Canadian Corps would eventually total four divisions, with a
17 Michael S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2005), p. 292.

rS Rosemary Thorp, 'Latin America and the international economy from the First World
War to the world depression', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin
America, vol. vr: 1870-1930 (Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 66.
19 Theo Balderston, 'Industrial mobilization and war economies', in Horne (ed.), A
Companion to World War I,

p.
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fifth division broken up to provide replacements. Overall, 619,000 Canadians
served during the war, with 424,589 serving overseas, out of a population of
20
7.5 million people. The situation was not much better within the United
States <in 1917, when the nation declared war with approximately 30 0 ,000
troops (federal and state) available. Eventually the United States would raise
a force of 4.4 million, with nearly half of these serving overseas, out of a
21
population of 103 million people. Overall, each nation suffered a comparable
number of casualties, with 66,665 Canadians and 53,402 Americans killed in
battle. The discrepancy was evident in the proportions that these numbers
represented, nearly n per cent of the Canadian forces and i.2 per cent of the
US military. 22

England French-Canadian textile communities. This immigrant community
saw no contradiction between sending its own sons off to fight in the US army
while simultaneously offering refuge to French-Canadian draft-dodgers. 24
The time it took to raise, transport and train troops from North America
meant that these armies did not actually enter the front lines until months
after their respective nations entered the war. Initially both the Americans and
Canadians fought under the tutelage of the more experienced French and
British armies. Canada and the United States faced similar pressure to raise
troops that could be amalgamated into the British and French armies, but
domestic nationalistic sentiment and concerns about how European generals
were conducting the war caused each to develop an independent, national
army instead.
Unhappiness with the British decision to launch a counter-attack using
Canadian troops after Germany's first mass gas attack during the Second
Battle of Ypres ensured 'that the lSt Division became the core of Canada's
national army rather than an "imperial" formation drawn from a dominion',
Terry Copp concludes. 25 In April 1917, all four Canadian battalions went into
action for the first time at the Battle of Arras, when they took Vimy Ridge.
General Arthur Currie was credited with the victory and in June 1917 given
command of the Canadian Corps. The Canadians became convinced that they
were an elite fighting force which could succeed where the British and French
could not. 'In those few minutes I witnessed the birth of a nation', BrigadierGeneral A. E. Ross declared after the war, a notion that has provoked much
debate ever since.
Canadians placed tremendous faith in Currie (the first Canadian to attain
the rank of full general) to use Canadian soldiers effectively and prudently
while maintaining a certain degree of autonomy on the battlefield. General
John ]. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces
(AEF), faced similar expectations within the United States. Seeking to demonstrate his own leadership abilities on the battlefield, Pershing steadfastly
re~isted any formal amalgamation of the American army into the Allied
forces. An independent US army met Wilson's larger political goals as well.
Pershing sailed to France with clear instructions from the American Secretary
of War, Newton Baker, 'to cooperate with the forces of the other countries
employed against the enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be

The United States and Canada raised their forces differently. The United
States adopted conscription immediately and eventually drafted 72 per cent of
the armed forces. With this decision the United States broke with its tradition
of fighting first with volunteers and only using conscription to fill the ranks
when enlistments lagged. Introducing conscription after the nation suffered
heavy losses on the battlefield would increase the likelihood of mass protests
against the draft, American officials reasoned, aware that the nation had been
sharply divided over entering the war. Canada opted to wait until replacement
needs became acute, only turning to conscription in 1917 to raise nearly
23
100,000 troops. The ability to apply for exemptions helped make the draft
more politically acceptable within the United States and Canada. The majority
of draft-eligible Americans and Canadians publicly registered for the draft, and
then retreated to the privacy of their homes to fill out a form requesting an
exemption. The pockets of outright opposition to conscription reflected preexisting ethnic and regional schisms. Draft resistance occurred primarily in
American southern rural communities that had opposed entering the war, and
within French-speaking Quebec, which resisted the government's attempts to
use wartime military service to underscore Anglo-Canadian dominance. Some
Quebecois even evaded conscription by fleeing across the border to New
20 Robert K. Hanks, 'Canada: Army' and James Carroll, Robert K. Hanks and Spencer

Tucker, 'Canada: Role in war', in Spencer C. Tucker (ed.), World War I: A Student
Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2005), pp. 257-9.
21 Jennifer D. Keene, World War I: The American Soldier Experience (Lincoln, NE: University
of Nebraska, 20u), pp. 33, 163.
22 Newfoundland was a separate colony during the war, so its disproportionately high
casualty rate is not included in these figures. The 8,500 men who enlisted in

Newfoundland represented nearly

IO

per cent of the adult male population. Of these,

3,600 were either killed or wounded.

23

J.

L. Granatstein, 'Conscription in the Great War', in Mackenzie (ed.), Canada and the
First World War, p. 70.
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24 Christopher Capazzola, Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modem
American Citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 4L
25 Terry Copp, 'The military effort, 1914-1918', in Mackenzie (ed.), Canada and the First
World War, p. 43.
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kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and
distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be
26
preserved'. Wilson depended on having a strong, visible and independent
American presence on the battlefield when the Allies won the war. The United
States needed to play a major role in the fighting, Wilson believed, to
guarantee him a prominent voice in fashioning the peace, ·which, after all,
was one of the primary reasons the President had led the nation into war. The
Americans never gained complete independence (they were always dependent to some degree on Allied logistical assistance), but by the fall of 1918 the
AEF did occupy its own sector of the Western Front.
Americans and Canadians claimed that their troops embodied a new brand of
masculinity born on the frontier, which emphasised aggression, ingenuity and
individualism. These traits supposedly separated North American soldiers from
their class-bound, weary European counterparts. In 1917, the Canadian Prime
Minister, Sir Robert Borden, unsuccessfully proposed that the Canadian
army take the lead in training the American army, 'because Canadians, like
Americans, did not have an aristocracy that placed birth over merit'. 27 American
military training doctrine explicitly underscored the differences in temperament
between American and European soldiers, identifying individual rifle marksmanship and 'open warfare' as the hallmarks of the American fighting man.
'Berlin cannot be taken by the French or the British Armies or by both of them.
It can only be taken by a thoroughly trained, entirely homogeneous American
Army', General H. B. Fiske, the head of the American Expeditionary Forces
training programme, told his colleagues. 28 The preference for rifles over heavy
artillery remained the bedrock principle of US army doctrine that in Pershing's
mind defined the American 'way of war'.
Both the United States and Canada also felt that their military contributions
and valour went underappreciated by Britain and France. The fear that Britain
might not adequately document the Canadian war effort led to the creation of
a Canadian War Records Office that collected materials and publicised
Canadian military feats to Canadian and English audiences. Likewise an outpouring of nationally focused books, articles and films in the United States left
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Americans with the dear impression that the United States had practically
won the war single-handedly. The feeling of being junior partners in a
European-led coalition no doubt caused some of this chest-thumping. More
importantly, the political desire of the United States and Canada to parlay their
wartime participation into greater influence within the new world order also
necessitated impressing Britain and France with the contribution each nation
had made to the Allied victory. The exact contributions of American and
Canadian troops to the overall Allied victory continue to excite debate on both
sides of the Atlantic to this day.
The increased importance of the Dominions to the British war effort led
to the Imperial War Conferences in 1917 and 1918 which gave Dominion
Prime Ministers or representatives a chance to negotiate how their economies and armies contributed to the war effort. The Dominions also sent
their own delegations to the Peace Conference, then signed and ratified the
peace treaties individually. 29 The leading American negotiator, Colonel
Edward House, welcomed this development, viewing any fracturing within
the British Empire as positive for the United States. The Canadian Prime
Minister, Borden, 'deliberately brought the point of view of North America
to the councils of the empire, a point of view that reflected the growing
identity of Canadian and American interests', notes Borden's biographer,
Robert Brown. 30 At the Peace Conference Borden experimented with a new
international role as mediator between the two most powerful Englishspeaking world powers. In a manner of speaking, Canada had a foot in
both camps, and saw itself as uniquely positioned to explain North American
concerns to Britain and its Dominions and British Empire worries to
America. Borden intervened several times to fashion compromises when
American and British delegations clashed on treaty details, arguing especially forcefully (if futilely) against hefty German reparations to avoid
antagonising the United States. 'Part of this was self-interest: a reoccurring
nightmare in Ottawa was that Canada might find itself fighting on the side of
Britain and its ally Japan against the United States', Margaret MacMillan

29 Robert Aldrich and Christopher Hillard, 'The French and British Empires', in Horne
26 United States Anny in the World War, 1917-1919, 17 vols. (Washington, DC: Center of
Military History, 2001), vol. r, p. 3.
27 John English, 'Political leadership in the First World War', in Mackenzie (ed.), Canada
and the First World War, p. So. Mitchell A. Yokelson, Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under
British Command, 1918 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), pp. 76-7.
28 Jennifer D. Keene, Doughboys, the Great War and the Remaking of America (Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2001), p. 106.
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(ed.), A Companion to World War I, p. 532.
30 Robert Craig Brown, 'Canada in North America', in John Braeman, Robert H. Brenner
and David Brody (eds.), Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 1971), p. 359. See also Robert Craig Brown, "Whither are we being
shoved?" Political leadership in Canada during World War I', in ]. L. Granatstein and
R. D. Cuff (eds.), War and Society in North America (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1971),
pp. 104-19.
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asserts. 31 The shared ancestry, language, literature, political institutions and
beliefs made a potential alliance between the United States and Great Britain
'sufficient to ensure the peace of the world' if the League of Nations failed
Borden told Lloyd George. 32 This plan never came to pass, but Borden'~
sentiments revealed that at the level of high diplomacy, relations between
Britain and Anglo-North America emerged intact from the war.

The US and Canada: comparisons and relations
Comparing the war experiences of the United States and Canada uncovers
an array of parallels that helped define the North American experience of
war. These comparable paths underscore similarities in settlement patterns,
political ideals and economic development. The national identities of the
United States and Canada traced their political and demographic origins to
the white-settler Anglo communities that had originally colonised the continent. This vision of national identity ignored the other demographic realities
that had peopled North America: slavery, Spanish and French colonisation and
large-scale immigration by non-Anglo peoples in the early twentieth century.
Throughout the war, the United States and Canada grappled with organised protests by marginalised minorities. The ongoing struggle for racial
equality within the United States sparked racial riots, lynching and widescale state surveillance of African-American political organisations and periodicals. Over 400,000 African Americans served in the military, with 89 per cent
placed in non-combatant, labouring roles. 'The attempted exclusion of African
Americans from a national memory of the war complemented larger attempts
to marginalize African Americans as citizens from the polity', notes Chad
Williams. 33 The Canadian government's campaign to suppress bilingual
schools, begun in 1912, stoked fears within Quebec that wartime military
service would turn into one more vehicle that eliminated French-Canadian
culture and autonomy. The lagging French-Canadian enlistments (estimated
by the British War Office as the lowest in the Empire), draft evasion and the
anti-conscription 1918 Easter riot in Quebec City, all attested to the vibrancy
of this ethnic conflict. 'A war that many thought could unite French and
English Canadians had proved everything to the contrary', Patrice A. Dutil

North America

concludes. 34 Rather than breaking down the physical, cultural and political
separation between the majority and minority populations, the war reinforced
the isolation of these minority communities. Native peoples served in both the
American and Canadian armies, an experience that provoked a contradictory
mix of pressure to assimilate while in uniform and then, once they returned
home, opportunities to revive traditional warrior ceremonies and traditions.
The longstanding view of Native Americans as a 'vanishing race' fuelled
an array of home-front assaults on Native American communities, as government agents in the United States and Canada leased indigenous lands to nonIndians as part of the drive to maximise wartime crop, mineral and livestock
production. These minority groups thus ended the war with new sets of
grievances over their poor treatment by the majority culture, amid fresh
evidence that the federal governments in each nation intended to maintain
the status quo.
The transatlantic labour market that linked North America to Europe
had funnelled nearly 3 million people to Canada from 1896-1914 and over
8 million Europeans to the United States from 1900-09. Only British subjects
could enlist in the Canadian army, consequently recruits came predominantly from the Anglo-British community, both Canadian and British-born.
The ethnic composition of the military thus reaffirmed the 'British' identity
of Canada. Besides putting their own German immigrant population under
surveillance, Canada took concrete steps to protect its borders from the
large anti-British immigrant populations residing in a neutral United States.
Canadian fantasies that German spies might somehow entice GermanAmerican or Irish-American communities to conduct guerrilla raids, caused
Canadian authorities to keep 16,ooo soldiers stationed along the border, part
of a 50,000-man force that remained at home to repel any direct attack on
Canadian soil. 35 Once the United States entered the war, the need for such
a strong southern border defence evaporated, allowing Canada to send
reinforcements to France at a critical moment in the fighting. Within the
US army, foreign-born soldiers (who had declared their intent to become
citizens) composed nearly one-fifth of the wartime force, contributions to

31 Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random
House, 2001), pp. 47-8.
32 Quoted in ibid., p. 48.
33 Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I
Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 20ro), p. 3or.

34 Patrice A. Dutil, 'Against isolationism: Napoleon Belcourt, French Canada, and "La
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the war cause that helped recent immigrants from Allied nations assimilate
into the mainstream culture.
Throughout the early twentieth century, native-born and immigrant workers moved freely back and forth across the US-Canadian border, helping
solidify transnational bonds between labour unions, socialist groups and the
radical Industrial Workers of the World that caught the attention of intelligence services in both countries. In the post-war period, Canadians and
Americans accused recently arrived immigrants from southern and central
Europe of diluting North America's Anglo racial and cultural heritage. These
immigrants were also charged with importing radical, Bolshevik ideologies
that threatened capitalism and representative democracy. Protecting North
America from Bolshevism became a joint US-Canadian endeavour, with the
two governments sharing information about suspect labour groups throughout the war and during the post-war Red Scare. 36
Culturally, economically and politically there was little reason for conflict
between the United States and Canada. Diplomacy helped maintain tranquillity along the northern border of the United States. By 1914 an embryonic
bilateral US-Canadian relationship allowed for direct negotiations (albeit with
British oversight on the Canadian side). In the early twentieth century, several
international commissions began tackling the traditional causes of conflict
(settling formal boundaries, access to fisheries and agreed use of shared rivers
and lakes) between the United States and Canada. These permanent commissions operated outside the formal diplomatic channels still controlled by
Britain, and their founding coincided with the closure of the last remaining
British garrisons in North America in 1906. Canada was now responsible for
resolving disputes, diplomatic and military, with the United States. The
temporary appointment of an independent wartime Canadian representative
within the British Embassy in Washington, DC, made Canada the only British
Dominion that had the ability to talk directly to the US government. These
developments paved the way for wartime cooperation and the eventual
establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1927. 37
Cultural connections reinforced these growing diplomatic ties. A steady
stream of US-produced movies, magazines, newspapers, books, advertisements and music poured into Canada. The sheer number of products created
for the much larger American audience and the efficient railroad distribution
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networks that transported them throughout Anglo-North America, made it
difficult for distinctly Canadian cultural offerings to thrive. American touring
companies regularly included Canadian cities and towns on their itineraries,
exposing Canadians to a full range of American circuses, vaudeville shows,
minstrel acts and Wild West shows. These facts dismayed the Canadian
cultural elite, but the general public avidly consumed American movies and
music with little debate or reflection before the war. The influx of British
imports also hampered the development of Canadian cultural traditions, as
many middle- and upper-class Canadians actively sought to maintain and
cultivate this cultural connection to mother England.
The war, however, temporarily disrupted this benign cultural relationship
between Canada and the United States. The first fissures appeared when Canada
entered the war and the United States remained neutral. Wartime Canada
avidly consumed Canadian-authored books explaining the war, along with
British films like the Battle of the Somme (1916). 'Had American mass culture
been merely inadequate, perhaps such [British] import substitutes would have
seen Canadians happily through the war years', notes Paul Litt. 'But in fact,
38
American cultural products were not merely lacking - they were offensive.'
Heightened Canadian patriotism, along with pride in fighting as part of the
British Empire, suddenly made Canadians aware of how much flag-waving
and jingoism permeated US-produced films, songs, books and plays. Canadians
chafed at the tone of moral superiority that America adopted as a neutral
nation, well aware of the profits flowing into US coffers from the healthy
munitions trade. French-Canadian Senator Napoleon Belcourt aptly summarised Canadian views towards US neutrality: 'mere money making is after all but
a very poor, indeed a very miserable compensation for the loss of national
prestige, national honor, caused by neglecting or ignoring modern solidarity,
the solidarity of civilized mankind'. 39 America's entry into the war helped ease
these cultural tensions, but 'during the 1920s and 1930s, no Canadian forgot that
Canada, with one-tenth the population, had more killed and wounded than the
40
United States', noted historians John Herd Thompson and Stephen]. Randall.

Conflict between Mexico and the United States
In 1916 it appeared more likely that the United States would go to war with
Mexico than enter the Great War. Mexican politics had been in upheaval since
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the Mexican Revolution began in l9IO. The United States played a direct role
in the revolution, temporarily intervening in 1914 with a landing in Veracruz
that helped bring a new leader, Venustiano Carranza, to power. As Carranza
fell out of favour with the Americans, his supporters hatched the Plan of San
Diego, which called for a series of raids into US border towns to kill all the
Anglo-Americans living there and incite an uprising among the remaining
Mexican-Americans and blacks. 41 A Mexican invasion was to follow to establish Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado and California as independent
republics that could opt to join Mexico. The plan fell apart when the US
government got wind of it. An increased troop presence along the border
dealt effectively with the few guerrilla raids attempted in 1915. On 9 March
1916, however, the anti-Carranza Mexican revolutionary, General Francisco
'Pancho' Villa, attacked Columbus, New Mexico with a force of 500, killing
eighteen Americans. Villa intended to provoke the United States into
invading Mexico, hoping to weaken Carranza' s constitutional government
by exposing its inability to prevent a US violation of Mexican national
sovereignty. German operatives in Mexico helped finance these rebel activities, expecting a border war to distract the United States from the European
conflict.
As Villa (and Germany) anticipated, Wilson answered this first attack on
American soil since the War of 1812 by sending a 14,000-man expeditionary
force into Mexico without Carranza' s permission or approval. Another
140,000 National Guardsmen (state-controlled militias mobilised into active
federal service) and regular army troops patrolled the border. 42 'The deeper
the expedition penetrated, the more Mexicans suspected that the dreaded
Yanquis were bent on conquest', John Milton Cooper, Jr. notes. These suspicions led to a series of clashes between US troops and governmental forces,
including a firefight in Carrizal on 21 June 1916. 43 In the wake of this clash
Wilson prepared a request for congressional authority to occupy northern
Mexico, which he subsequently abandoned upon learning that American
soldiers had fired first. This was the closest the two countries had come to
war since the Mexican-American War oh846-8.
In contrast to American reluctance to enter the European war, Wilson faced
strong ,pressure from some cabinet officials and Congress to go to war with

Mexico in 1916. Realising that formal hostilities would lead to a lengthy war,
Wilson and Carranza agreed instead to appoint a mediation commission that
paved the way for the withdrawal of US troops on 5 February 1917. In 1916,
Wilson ran for re-election with the campaign slogan, 'He kept us out of war.'
Most historians equate the phrase with Wilson's handling of the Lusitania
crisis, but Democrats campaigning for Wilson gave equal weight to Mexico
during their stump speeches. 44 Wilson offered many reasons for wanting to
avoid a border war, including suspicions that those pushing for armed intervention really wanted improved access to Mexican oil, which British and
American business interests had long vied to control. Wilson also knew that
having half a million troops bogged down in Mexico would severely hamper
the creation of an American expeditionary force if the United States went to
war with Germany. 'Germany is anxious to have us at war with Mexico, so
that our minds and our energies will be taken off the great war across the sea',
Wilson told his personal secretary. 45
The Mexican punitive expedition failed in its stated goal of capturing Villa,
but 'its real purpose was a display of the power of the United States', Secretary
of War Newton Baker asserted. 46 The US military, under-strength and underequipped in comparison to the European armies fighting along the Western
Front, gained important experience fighting its first sustained campaign since
the 1898 Spanish-American War. The invasion's commander, Brigadier
General John J. Pershing, would go on to lead the wartime army, carrying
the lessons learned from Mexico to France. The incursion gave the army its
first test mobilising National Guard troops and readying them for combat,
along with practice mounting the surveillance and logistics needed to maintain an army on the move. None of this went particularly well or smoothly in
Mexico, a harbinger of the challenges ahead. These problems helped preparedness advocates win some funding to enlarge, reorganise and modernise the
nation's military in the days leading up to America's entry into the First World
War. Those determined to avoid any involvement in the European war had
steadfastly opposed preparedness as one step removed from intervention. The
armed clash with Mexico, however, allowed the preparedness faction to
argue that the nation needed a stronger military to protect its borders. 47
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The National Defense Act of 1916 increased the size of the peacetime army and
federal supervision of state troops, and laid the groundwork for federal
mobilisation of the economy - measures designed with the European war in
mind. Visions of men going into battle without enough machine guns or
flying airplanes that routinely crashed (as in Mexico), prompted Congress to
appropriate more money for both.
Viewing the Zimmermann Telegram within the context of Mexican rebel
border raids, the San Diego plan and armed clashes between US and Mexican
troops, helps illuminate Germany's decision to send the telegram, and the
subsequent US outrage. The Zimmermann Telegram proposed that Mexico
ally with Germany to recoup territory lost in the mid nineteenth century, if
Germany and the United States went to war. 'Mexico's hatred for America is
well-founded and old', German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, assured
his German colleagues, citing the American military' s recent poor performance
chasing Villa to predict a long, drawn-out war between Mexico and the United
States that would keep American troops tied down in North America. 48
Zimmermann's enthusiastic endorsement of this proposed German-Mexican
alliance represented a complete change of heart. Only a year earlier he had
rejected Mexico's offer to house German U-boat bases to avoid a rupture in
US-German relations. In January 1917, however, Zimmermann believed that
the German decision to resume unconditional submarine warfare would be
likely to bring the United States into the war. By sending the secret telegram,
Zimmermann inadvertently played a major role in ensuring American belligerency once the British intercepted, decoded and then passed the telegram on to
the American government. The telegram's publication in March 1917 unified a
previously divided America~ public in favour of war with Germany. 'The note
had its greatest impact in precisely those areas of the United States where
isolationism and thus opposition to U.S. involvement in the war were particularly strong: the Southwest', writes Friedrich Katz; border states where the
recent troubles with Mexico loomed the largest. 49
The aftershocks of the Zimmermann Telegram went beyond prompting
US entry into the war. Within North America the note threatened further
damage to US-Mexican relations, as Carranza hedged on his response.
Publicly denying that he had ever received the telegram, Carranza privately
contemplated the likelihood of another American invasion, what kind of

military aid Germany could reasonably give and his advisers' assessment that
the proposal was unworkable. On 14 April 1917, eight days after the United
States declared war on Germany, Carranza told the German ambassador to
Mexico that he intended to remain neutral.
As Wilson wanted, Mexico adopted a new constitution in 1917 that allowed
for universal suffrage and land reform. But Carranza also moved to reassert
national control over Mexican natural resources, especially oil and minerals. His
government imposed higher taxes, required landowners to get official approval
before selling land to foreigners and added a constitution clause that conferred
ownership of all underground resources to the nation rather than the landowner. These measures had little immediate effect. The Mexican government
made no effort to enforce this constitutional clause, and foreign warships
ensured that oil fields along the Gulf coast continued to produce record amounts
of oil for the Allied war effort. Reports that the Americans were seriously
considering a limited occupation of Mexican oil fields, the ban on American
loans to Mexico and a US embargo on arms, food and gold, however, prompted
Carranza to continue ongoing, if fruitless, conversations with German officials
for the rest of the war about a possible alliance. In the spring of 1919, the
possibility of war between the United States and Mexico loomed once again.
American oil interests and some members of Wilson's administration began
plotting a coup with Carranza' s opponents, all the while pressuring Wilson to
break diplomatic relations. Coinciding with the incapacitating stroke that rendered Wilson bed-ridden for months, these plans went nowhere. The drumbeat
of criticism in the press and Congress nonetheless strained relations with
Carranza until his eventual overthrow by the military in the spring of 1920.50
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The North American origins of Wilsonianism
The United States had long seen the Monroe Doctrine (an 1823 pronouncement by President James Monroe that the Western Hemisphere was off-limits
to future colonisation by other world powers) as a commitment to guarantee
the sovereignty of newly independent nations throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Wilson's predecessors had already enlarged the scope of the
Monroe Doctrine to include the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary (which justified US
regional policing to prevent 'wrongdoing') and strengthen the US regional
economic presence through dollar diplomacy. Wilson now attempted to apply
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the principles of the Monroe Doctrine globally. The wording of Wilson's
famous 'Peace without Victory' speech of 1917, which proposed a negotiated
settlement to the world war, explicitly presented the American experience in
the Western Hemisphere as a model for future international relations. 'I am
proposing ... ', Wilson stated, 'that the nations should with one accord adopt
the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation
should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every
people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of
development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the
powerful.'
Wilson's willingness to intervene militarily to make Mexico and the
Caribbean 'safe for democracy' served as a 'rehearsal for preparing the nation
for the grand task of global reconstruction' that Wilson would attempt once
the United States entered the world war, Akira Iriye argues. 51 Many of the
ideals that Wilson would go on to trumpet through his 1918 Fourteen Points
address and at the Versailles peace negotiations, he initially proposed to
improve US relations with its southern neighbour. Hoping to teach
Mexicans 'to elect good men', Wilson floated a proposal for a Pan-American
Pact that would allow the United States to work in concert with Argentina,
Chile and Brazil to promote democracy, settle disputes and guarantee
borders within the Western Hemisphere. 'Although nothing came of the
Pan-American pact, its provisions contained language and ideas that Wilson
would use in the Covenant of the League of Nations', Cooper notes. 52 The
limits that Wilson imposed on regional interventions and his attempt to devise
a method of collective security to handle disputes within the Western
Hemisphere revealed that, 'in the Wilsonian way of war, the limits of force
were equal in importance to the power of force', asserts Frederick
S. Calhoun. 53
Wilson ultimately failed to convince isolationists within the United States
(who clung to the Monroe Doctrine as a way to limit US involvement in world
affairs) that the time had come for active participation in the League
of Nations. His opponents argued that joining the League of Nations would
threaten US regional dominance and embroil the nation in 'entangling alliances' that would lead to involvement in future European wars. The desire to

define its own foreign policy unilaterally and to continue relying on North
America's physical distance from Europe to maintain diplomatic and political
independence, ultimately prevailed over Wilson's suggestion that the United
States take on more formal responsibility as the world's guardian of democracy and humanity. Participation in the world war thus only reaffirmed
America's view of itself as a North American nation.
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Conclusion
The war noticeably amplified American influence within the Western
Hemisphere and the increased integration of North American economies
and politics. The trend towards regional integration under the leadership of
the United States did not go unchallenged. In 1919, Mexican President
Carranza vocally disputed Wilson's claim that the Monroe Doctrine benefited nations seeking to determine their own futures. Instead, he assailed
the policy as extending the imperial reach of the United States within the
Western Hemisphere by imposing 'upon independent nations a protectorate status which they do not ask for and which they do not require' .54
Carranza instead proposed pan-Hispanic cooperation to curb US hegemony in
the region, foreshadowing future ideological disputes over whether America
was a 'good neighbour' or 'imperialist' in the Western Hemisphere. Carranza
unsuccessfully urged smaller and weaker Central American nations to join
together to prevent the United States from intervening unilaterally in their
domestic affairs. He had better luck fostering a strong sense of Mexican
nationalism built upon a legacy of wartime tension with the United States.
Canada's embrace of imperial nationhood revealed its commitment to evolve
as a nation within, rather than in opposition to, the British Empire. The centrality of the memory of the First World War within Canada helped reinforce its
sense of solidarity with other Dominions whose national identities became
inextricably linked to their battlefield experiences. No sense of shared wartime
sacrifice bound the United States and Canada together in the post-war period.
Instead, the memory of the war took quite different trajectories on each side of
the border. The decentralised way in which American communities commemorated the war prevented any unifying collective memory of the war from taking
root. The absence of a national monument to the war in Washington, DC,
stands in notable contrast to the dominating presence of the Peace Tower and
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the National War Memorial in Ottawa. These sites of memory strengthened
Canada's cultural identification with the British Empire, a relationship which
bestowed economic benefits as well. The 1932 Ottawa Conference, for instance,
established a five-year privileged trading relationship among Britain and its
Dominions at the height of the Great Depression (much to America's irritation).
Overall, however, the war accelerated the coordination of the American
and Canadian diplomatic goals and domestic policies, strengthening bilateral relations between the two nations. To the south, the war unsettled
US-Mexican relations, ultimately prompting the United States to use force
to assert its economic, political and military dominance. Whether the
process was rocky as in the case of US-Mexican relations or relatively
smooth as between the United States and Canada, the economic and
political integration of North America was one of the key global legacies
of the First World War.
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